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Abstract
This paper asks whether an aggressive monetary policy response to inflation is feasible in
countries that suffer from fiscal dominance, as long as monetary policy also responds to
fiscal variables. We find that if nominal interest rates are allowed to respond to government
debt, even aggressive rules that satisfy the Taylor principle can produce unique equilibria.
But following such rules results in extremely volatile inflation. This leads to very frequent
violations of the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates that make such rules infeasible.
Even within the set of feasible rules the optimal response to inflation is highly negative, and
more aggressive inflation fighting is inferior from a welfare point of view. The welfare gain
from responding to fiscal variables is minimal compared to the gain from eliminating fiscal
dominance.
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"... A central bank charged with maintaining price stability cannot be indifferent as to how fiscal pol-
icy is determined" (Woodford, 2001) "Ideally, where fiscal policy that undermines central bank control
of inflation is a real possibility, this should be accounted for, discussed in inflation reports, and reflected
in central bank projections" (Sims, 2005)
1 Introduction
Is a monetary authority’s commitment to fighting inflation aggressively a sufficient
condition for ensuring price stability? It has long been held that the answer to this question
should be negative. The reason is that the central bank’s inflation objective may collide
with an inflexible, or dominant, stance of fiscal policy that is unable or unwilling to adjust
primary surpluses to stabilize government debt. Fiscal dominance was analyzed by Sargent
and Wallace (1981) in an economy with real debt, where an unrealistic inflation objective
leads to insufficient seigniorage revenue in the short run that has to be made up by higher
seigniorage, and therefore inflation, in the long run. The fiscal theory of the price level of
Woodford (1996, 1998, 2001)1 considers an economy with nominal debt, and shows that
non-explosive government debt in the face of dominant fiscal policy can only be guaranteed
by ensuring that real interest rates fall when inflation rises.2 This is the opposite of the
Taylor (1993) principle for stabilizing inflation, which requires higher real interest rates in
response to higher inflation, and which is generally taken to represent the notion of fighting
inflation aggressively. The Taylor principle is derived in a standard New Keynesian setup
for monetary policy analysis by assuming that the fiscal authority sets lump sum taxes that
satisfy a balanced budget requirement.
In this paper we focus on inflation targeting under fiscal dominance as in Woodford
(2001), motivated by the belief that this framework may be appropriate to describe the
1 Other key contributions to this literature are Cochrane (1998) and Sims (1994). A long
list of additional references is contained in Cochrane (1998, 2000) and Woodford (2001).
2 This assumption implies that the out of equilibrium present value of budget supluses is
not equal to the real value of debt. This does not mean that the government does not care about satisfying the
intertemporal budget constraint. It is that the level of surplus is set before the price level is determined.
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pressures facing at least some of the developing countries that have recently started to adopt
inflation targeting. The reasons for fiscal dominance include some combination of a weak
fiscal revenue base, a rudimentary tax collection system that encourages tax evasion, the
contingent bailout liabilities attached to weak banking systems, and simple overspending at
the federal or regional level. Under such conditions, if the government has issued nominal
debt denominated in local currency, fiscal difficulties are often resolved not through an
increase in tax revenues but instead through high inflation that erodes the real value of
government liabilities.3 The assumptions underlying the policy recommendations of the
inflation targeting literature are therefore clearly not satisfied.
But the recent literature has shown that this alone does not settle the question of whether
fiscal dominance unambiguously prevents a central bank from fighting inflation. On the one
hand, Loyo (1999) and Sims (2005) hold that a lack of fiscal adjustment could make inflation
targeting completely infeasible. But on the other hand, Benigno and Woodford (2006) argue
that while inflation volatility is higher under fiscal dominance, it need not be excessively high
as long as medium term inflation expectations are anchored. To show this they compute a
Ramsey optimal policy where the monetary authority implicitly responds to fiscal variables.
The result of a Ramsey optimal policy is a set of implied laws of motion for the main
macroeconomic variables, but unfortunately there is no obvious mapping from such a policy
to an implementable policy rule, which for a modern central bank would invariably take the
form of an interest rate rule. It is therefore not immediately obvious whether the results of
Benigno and Woodford (2006) should be interpreted as fighting inflation aggressively in the
sense of the Taylor principle. Moreover, the Ramsey policymaker is assumed to formulate
policies in response to a great deal of information that includes private agents’ behavioral
rules and expectations, while in practice policymakers have to set interest rates in response
3 If all of an inflation targeting government’s debt is denominated in foreign currency, the
same circumstances would result in a balance of payments crisis, as shown by Kumhof, Li
and Yan (2007). Kumhof and Tanner (2007) presents evidence on the size of local currency government debt
markets in developing countries.
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to observable economic variables and subject to practical constraints. The question of what
constitutes an optimal policy therefore needs to be narrowed even further, and we attempt
to do so in this paper. Specifically, we ask whether a benevolent monetary authority can
substitute for fiscal adjustment if its only available policy instrument is the nominal interest
rate, if that interest rate is restricted to respond in a linear fashion to observed macroeconomic
variables, and if that interest rate may not hit its zero lower bound excessively often. The
spirit of the exercise is similar to Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe’s (2006) analysis of simple and
implementable rules.
But we add one key innovation. It is based on the observation that, under fiscal
dominance, the monetary authority must be clearly aware that it is the only entity capable of
ensuring not only price stability but also fiscal solvency. It is therefore natural to suppose that
it would take fiscal variables such as government debt into account in formulating its policy,
and that this would increase its ability to react aggressively to inflation. We therefore allow
the nominal interest rate to respond not only to inflation and output, but also to government
spending or to government debt.
We then analyze the feasibility and desirability of an aggressive response of the interest
rate to inflation by applying three successive criteria. First, we check for determinacy of
equilibria. Second, we rule out determinate equilibria that violate the zero lower bound on
nominal interest rates too frequently. Third, we rank the remaining equilibria by computing
their welfare implications.
Equilibrium determinacy under different monetary and fiscal rules was the subject of
Leeper’s (1991) seminal contribution that will also form the benchmark of our study. Under
a passive fiscal policy the fiscal authority adjusts taxes in order to meet the government
budget constraint. In this case determinacy requires an active monetary policy that reacts
strongly to inflation to achieve price stability. Under an active fiscal policy the primary
surplus does not respond to the level of government debt. Determinacy then requires a
passive monetary policy so that inflation can balance the budget, and this prevents price
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stability from being achieved. All other combinations of fiscal and monetary policies do
not lead to a unique equilibrium. Since the New Keynesian literature has assumed that
the fiscal authority adjusts taxes appropriately, the usual policy recommendation is to have
the monetary authority fight inflation aggressively. More recently Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe
(2006) have analyzed the combinations of fiscal and monetary rules that lead to a unique
equilibrium when allowing for the more realistic case of distortionary taxation. They also
add the zero lower bound criterion in checking for the implementability of different rules.
Their paper broadly confirms Leeper’s results.
Our results first restate the case for the Taylor principle in the absence of fiscal dominance.
We then show that under fiscal dominance it is indeed beneficial to include government
spending or government debt as an argument in the central bank’s interest rate rule, because
doing so entails an improvement, albeit very small, in welfare. But the optimal rules have
highly negative coefficients on inflation, and an inflation coefficient greater than one is
practically impossible even when monetary policy responds to fiscal variables. Government
spending in the policy rule does not even expand the range of determinate equilibria to
include inflation coefficients greater than one. When government debt enters the policy
rule, part of the determinacy region does include an inflation feedback coefficient greater
than one. But that region displays extremely high inflation volatility, and it is ruled out by
the zero lower bound constraint on nominal interest rates. Furthermore, inflation volatility
and welfare losses are much higher than under a Ricardian policy, and increase dramatically
as the coefficient on inflation is increased away from its optimal value.
Our conclusion contains an important message for developing countries’ central banks.
This is that fiscal discipline must absolutely be established before committing to inflation
targeting. Monetary policy alone cannot engineer a rescue.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 analyzes
optimal monetary and fiscal policy when fiscal policy is not dominant. Section 4 determines
optimal policy under fiscal dominance. Section 5 concludes.
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2 The Model
We take as our baseline case the model described in Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004a).
This model is simple but retains the necessary ingredients to evaluate fiscal and monetary
policy interactions. Namely, monetary policy is non-neutral due to a transactions cost
technology and due to sticky goods prices in a world of monopolistic competition. Financial
markets are incomplete in that the government can only issue one period nominal bonds.4
The presence of nominal bonds gives the government an incentive to use inflation to make
real returns state contingent as described in Chari and Kehoe (1999). In fact, if prices were
fully flexible then the real allocations would be the same as if markets were complete. In
this model, market incompleteness does matter because there are price adjustment costs. The
costs of changing prices can be motivated by costs of acquiring and processing information
(Zbaracki et al. (2005)). For the sake of realism the government can only use distortionary
forms of taxation.
Households are indexed by i ∈ [0, 1], and have the utility function
E0
∞X
t=0
βt(ln(cit) + δ ln(1− hit)) , (1)
where cit is consumption of the composite good and hit is labor effort. Consumption is in turn
an aggregate of imperfectly substitutable varieties cit(j),
cit =
µZ 1
0
cit(j)
1+η
η dj
¶ η
1+η
, (2)
so that cost minimization implies the set of goods demands
cit(j) = c
i
t
µ
Pt(j)
Pt
¶η
. (3)
Money facilitates consumption purchases, which are subject to a proportional transactions
cost
s(vit) = Av
i
t +B/v
i
t − 2
√
AB , (4)
4 Marcet and Scott (2001) provide arguments to support the assumption of incomplete markets.
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where vit = Ptcit/M it is money velocity, Pt is the aggregate price level of the composite
consumption good, andM it is nominal money holdings.
Producers are indexed by j ∈ [0, 1] and are identical to the set of households because
each household is the sole producer of a single variety yt(j) of the composite good. These
goods are produced with a linear technology
yt(j) = ztht(j) , (5)
where zt is productivity and ht(j) is labor hired in a competitive labor market. The output
market is monopolistically competitive, and each producer sets the price of the good it
supplies subject to quadratic price adjustment costs of the form
θ
2
µ
Pt(j)
Pt−1(j)
− 1
¶2
=
θ
2
(πt(j)− 1)2 , (6)
and taking the level of aggregate demand for its good as given. Aggregate demand consists
of private consumption demand ct(j) and government demand gt(j), with
yt(j) = ct(j) + gt(j) . (7)
Aggregate consumption demand is given by (3) aggregated over all demands i:
ct(j) = ct
µ
Pt(j)
Pt
¶η
. (8)
Government demands a composite gt that consists of the same varieties as the consumption
good, with the same elasticity of substitution, so that government demand for variety j is
given by
gt(j) = gt
µ
Pt(j)
Pt
¶η
. (9)
Aggregate output is then naturally given by
yt =
µZ 1
0
yt(j)
1+η
η dj
¶ η
1+η
. (10)
Financial assets include money and non-state contingent one period nominal government
bonds held from period t to t + 1, denoted by Bit , with gross nominal interest rate Rt. A
borrowing constraint is imposed to prevent households from engaging in Ponzi schemes.
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Non-financial income accrues to households in the form of net cash flows from their
activity as producers and from wage income. The former is given by Pt(i)yt (Pt(i)/Pt)η −
Wtht(i)− θ2 ((Pt(i)/Pt−1(i))− 1)
2, and the latter byWthit(1− τ t), whereWt is the nominal
wage (the real wage is denoted by wt) and τ t is the labor income tax rate.
The household budget constraint, combining the previous features, is given by
Ptcit[1 + s(v
i
t)] +M
i
t +B
i
t ≤M it−1 +Rt−1Bit−1 (11)
+ Pt
"µ
Pt(i)
Pt
¶
yt(i)− wtht(i)−
θ
2
µ
Pt(i)
Pt−1(i)
− 1
¶2#
+ (1− τ t)Ptwthit .
The household maximizes (1) subject to (11), (4), (5) and (6). The first-order conditions
for this problem are shown in Appendix A. Note that household superscripts and producer
indices can be dropped in these conditions as all agents face identical decision problems and
therefore obtain identical solutions in equilibrium.
The government budget constraint is given by
Mt +Bt =Mt−1 +Rt−1Bt−1 + Ptgt − τ tPtwtht . (12)
The monetary and fiscal authorities decide on the nominal interest rate and on the labor tax
rate {Rt, τ t}. The precise form of the rules that determine these two policy instruments is
of course critical for the presence and implications of fiscal dominance. Those rules will
therefore be discussed in detail in the subsequent sections of the paper.
Shock processes are given by the following laws of motion for productivity and
government spending:
ln gt = (1− λg) ln g + λg ln gt−1 + εgt ; εgt ˜N(0, σ2εg) , (13)
ln zt = (1− λz) ln z + λz ln zt−1 + εzt ; εzt˜N(0, σ2εz) . (14)
Calibration follows Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004) and is summarized in Table 1. A
bar over a variable indicates its steady state value. The time unit is one year.
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β 0.96 A 0.0111
π¯ 1.042 B 0.07524
h¯ 0.2 λg 0.9
g/y 0.2 σεg 0.0302
B/(PY ) 0.44 λz 0.82
η/(1 + η) 1.2 σεz 0.0229
θ 17.5/4
3 Monetary Policy in a Ricardian World
In this section we specify how the monetary authority can implement a desired
equilibrium in a world of endogenous taxation that ensures budget balance. The monetary
authority is assumed to specify an interest rate rule that responds to deviations of current
inflation and output from their target values, while the fiscal authority is assumed to raise or
lower labor tax rates in response to deviations - lagged by one year - of government liabilities
from a target value.5 This second, fiscal part of the rule ensures long-run government
solvency. In particular, we consider the rule:6,7
ln(Rt/R∗) = φRπ ln(πt/π
∗) + φRy ln(yt/y
∗) , (15)
τ t = τ ∗ + φτa(at−1 − a∗) .
where at−1 = (Mt−1+Rt−1Bt−1)/Pt−1 are total lagged government liabilities, π∗ and y∗ are
inflation and output target values of the monetary authority, and τ ∗ and a∗ are tax and asset
target values of the fiscal authority. As in Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2006), we set the target
5 This is based on the realistic premise that fiscal decisions occur with a one year lag.
6 Another Ricardian rule is sometimes considered in the literature, namely ln(Rt/Rt−1) =
φRπ ln(πt/π
∗)+φRy ln(yt/yt−1). This may be easier to implement, as the monetary authority does not need
information on the steady state levels of the interest rate and output. However, we have found qualitatively
very similar results between this rule and (15), and therefore concentrate our discussion on the latter.
7 Inflation forecast based rules would replace current inflation by expectations of inflation, but
this presumes that the monetary authority can perfectly observe private agents’ expectations. In practice this
could either mean extracting them from surveys or applying econometric techniques to extract
them from financial data. As for the former, Nunes (2005) shows why survey expectations
may not reflect actual expectations. As for the latter, in the developing countries that motivated this study the
data required to use these techniques are generally not available.
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values to be equal to the non-stochastic steady state of the associated Ramsey optimal policy
problem. Note that we are departing from the most conventional monetary policy analysis
because taxation is distortionary and is also an object of optimization.
We find that the parameter φRy does not affect most of our key results in an important
way, and we therefore show most results for the case φRy = 0. Where it does have some
effect we comment accordingly.8 The first panel of Figure 1, labelled “Determinacy”, shows
the equilibrium determinacy analysis. The vertical axis considers different values of the
feedback coefficient on government liabilities φτa while the horizontal axis considers different
values of the inflation feedback coefficient φRπ . White areas signal that the equilibrium
exists and is unique. The figure displays two white regions. One area is associated with
a sufficiently large tax response (significantly greater than zero) and a strong response of
interest rates to inflation φRπ (greater than one, the Taylor principle). In this constellation
of parameters the fiscal rule guarantees government solvency while the monetary rule fights
inflation aggressively in order to pin down the price level. This confirms the results known
from the New Keynesian literature with lump sum taxation. The second area corresponds to
an active fiscal and passive monetary policy.
In the next panel of Figure 1, labelled “Zero Bound”, we plot in black all rules that are
not consistent with either equilibrium determinacy or with the zero lower bound on nominal
interest rates.9 As in Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2006), the zero lower bound constraint is
imposed by requiring that E ln(R) ≥ 2σR. By comparing the first and second panel one can
see that the zero bound does not eliminate many rules. Both in the top left and bottom right
regions there are many rules that can lead to an implementable equilibrium.
The next panel “Welfare” plots welfare contours for combinations of coefficients that
satisfy the determinacy and zero lower bound conditions. We compute welfare using a
8 We found it sufficient to consider only three values of φRy to characterize the solutions,
namely φRy ∈ {−0.5, 0, 0.5}.
9 The reader is refered to Appendix B for details on these computations.
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second order approximation, as explained in detail in Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004b).10
Consider two policy regimes, a reference regime denoted by r, and an alternative regime
denoted by a. The welfare loss is defined as the fraction of regime r’s mean consumption
that the household would be willing to forego while still being as well off as under regime
a. We consider the Ramsey allocation to be the reference regime and the allocations induced
by the simple rule to be the alternative regime. We observe that the welfare results for an
active monetary and passive fiscal policy are generally superior to those for active fiscal and
passive monetary policy. Furthermore, welfare increases in the direction of a more aggressive
monetary response to inflation. The welfare loss of the best rule is 0.02%, and that rule is
given by11
ln(Rt/R∗) = 3 ln(πt/π∗) , (16)
τ t = τ ∗ + 0.36(at−1 − a∗) .
The final panel of Figure 1, labelled “Inflation Volatility”, shows that the welfare results
are closely related to the volatility of inflation implied by the chosen policy mix. It shows
that an active monetary policy response to inflation stabilizes inflation volatility far better
than an active fiscal policy. Furthermore this effect, which works through agents’ inflation
expectations, is stronger for a more aggressive response to inflation.
For later comparison with fiscal dominance, Figures 2a and 2b show impulse responses
for one standard deviation shocks to productivity and government spending. We observe that
in a Ricardian world monetary policy responds to inflation in the short run, while tax rates
are adjusted very gradually to stabilize debt in the long run. The critical feature of fiscal
dominance is that tax rates are not available for this task.
10 See also Collard and Juillard (2001). The reader is referred to Appendix C for a description
of the welfare computations.
11 We limit our search to inflation coefficients φRπ ≤ 3. A further small welfare improvement
would be attainable with even higher φRπ .
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4 Monetary Policy under Fiscal Dominance
Wemodel fiscal dominance by assuming that the tax rate is exogenous and constant. With
government spending specified as an exogenous stochastic process (13), fiscal instruments
are therefore not being used to ensure that the intertemporal budget constraint of the
government holds. In such a world the central bank has no choice but to accommodate
fiscal shocks. An important question is whether it can still fight inflation aggressively
while doing so. The conventional answer is that it cannot, and this is based on using a
monetary rule identical to (15) combined with exogenous taxes. But we suggest that a
monetary authority that knows it is the only institution capable of ensuring fiscal solvency (in
addition to price stability) would not ignore fiscal variables in setting its policy. We therefore
allow for monetary rules that may respond not only to inflation and output but also to fiscal
variables. We establish whether this improves the performance of interest rate rules under
fiscal dominance, and whether such rules may make it possible to respond aggressively to
inflation.
Specifically, the interest rate rules we consider continue to react to inflation and output.
But in addition we consider a response to deviations of either government spending or of
government liabilities from their desired levels. Stability and welfare analysis of the same
type as in Figure 1 is shown for these two cases in Figures 3 and 4.
4.1 Government Spending in the Interest Rate Rule
We first consider an interest rate rule that takes into account deviations of government
spending from a constant value g:
ln(Rt/R∗) = φRπ ln(πt/π
∗) + φRy ln(yt/y
∗) + φRg ln(gt/g) . (17)
Rule (17) posits that if government spending is 1% above its steady state level then the
interest rate will be changed by φRg basis points. This case is presented in Figure 3. The
main result is that responding to government expenditures does not increase the determinacy
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region for φRπ compared to the conventional case of φ
R
g = 0, as monetary policy still has to be
passive, φRπ < 1. The zero lower bound restriction on nominal interest rates imposes further
restrictions on the implementable range of feedback coefficients, specifically the coefficient
on government spending cannot be too large in absolute value. The best rule in the class (17)
is described by
ln(Rt/R∗) = −0.84 ln(πt/π∗)− 0.5 ln(yt/y∗) + 0.22 ln(gt/g) . (18)
We find that the welfare losses associated with this rule are very much larger than for the
Ricardian case, at 0.202% versus 0.02%. Allowing for a non-zero coefficient on government
spending is beneficial, but only slightly so, as under the restriction φRg = 0 welfare losses
can be shown to rise to 0.210%. The third panel of Figure 3 shows that maximizing welfare
calls for a highly negative coefficient on inflation, and that attempting a more aggressive
inflation response leads to lower welfare. The reason can be seen in the final panel of Figure
3, which shows that inflation volatility increases as φRπ is raised above its optimal value. This
not only leads to more volatile nominal interest rates and therefore violations of the zero
lower bound constraint, but also to more variable real interest rates and output, which causes
welfare losses. The Taylor principle in this case is not even consistent with determinacy,
not to mention the zero lower bound or welfare considerations. We now turn to another
argument of the policy rule that holds more promise in expanding the monetary authority’s
options, government liabilities.
4.2 Government Liabilities in the Interest Rate Rule
We consider an interest rate rule that responds to deviations of inflation and output from
their target values, as before, and to deviations of government debt (scaled by steady state
GDP) from its target value. Since the monetary authority faces no policy implementation
lags, we will assume that the interest rate rule reacts to the current level of government
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liabilities:
ln(Rt/R∗) = φRπ ln(πt/π
∗) + φRy ln(yt/y
∗) + φRa (at − a∗)/y∗ . (19)
The rule (19) assumes that if the ratio of government liabilities to output is 1 percentage
point higher than target, then the interest rate will be raised by φRa basis points. Does this rule,
which is considered in Figure 4, allow for an aggressive response to inflation? At first sight it
looks a lot more promising than Figure 3. Most strikingly, as long as solvency is guaranteed
by lowering interest rates sufficiently in response to excessive government liabilities, it
is now possible to reach the region of determinacy even with an aggressive response to
inflation. But this is an illusion, as the analysis of the zero lower bound condition on nominal
interest rates shows. All coefficient combinations that include an aggressive response to
inflation violate the lower bound, which makes this rule impossible to implement in practice.
For instance, if the coefficient on inflation were 1.5 and that on liabilities were -0.2, then
the standard deviation of interest rates would be 4.1. Such volatility implies that interest
rates would have to be higher than 8.2% on average to satisfy the lower bound condition,
while in our economy the average interest rate is 3.8%. It is true that many developing
economies experience high inflation and consequently high nominal interest rates. However,
if a successful inflation targeting regime were to be implemented in developing countries
then inflation and nominal interest rates would be lower. The best rule in this class is
ln(Rt/R∗) = −1.5 ln(πt/π∗)− 0.08(at − a∗)/y∗ . (20)
Similar to (17), we find that including government liabilities in the rule does lead to a slightly
better performance, with welfare losses dropping from 0.210% under the restriction φRa = 0
to 0.204% for (20).12 Maximizing welfare again calls for a highly negative coefficient on
inflation, and even pushing in the direction of a rule satisfying the Taylor principle, without
actually getting there, is detrimental. These welfare results are closely related to the implied
12 This makes little difference to the optimal behavior of monetary policy. Under the restriction φRa = 0 the
optimal coefficient on inflation changes to φRπ = −1.26.
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inflation volatilities of each regime, shown in the last panel of Figure 4. Under a Ricardian
regime inflation volatility is 0.08 for the optimal rule (16). Under fiscal dominance inflation
volatility is very much higher, about 1.5 when the optimal rule is implemented. Moreover,
the volatility of inflation increases dramatically as a more aggressive inflation response is
attempted. The implied volatility of the real interest rate and therefore of real variables
explains why welfare deteriorates in this attempt.
Finally, Figures 5a and 5b present the impulse responses for technology and government
spending shocks under rule (20). The crucial difference to the Ricardian case is that under
fiscal dominance the interest rate rather than the tax rate has to be used to stabilize debt, and
this stabilization takes place over a much shorter time horizon. As a result nominal and real
interest rates are much more volatile. The response of the debt to GDP ratio in each example
is the opposite of the Ricardian case.
Figure 5a shows that a positive productivity shock leads to an increase in the public debt,
rather than a fall as in Figure 2a. Under a Ricardian policy debt is used as a shock absorber.
This means that higher productivity, which reduces marginal cost and therefore inflation,
is allowed to reduce the real interest rate, thereby boosting demand and reinforcing the
direct effect of higher productivity on the real wage. The result is an increase in tax revenue
that, combined with the lower real interest rate, reduces debt. The economy subsequently
benefits from this debt reduction through a reduction of the distortionary labor tax rate,
which gradually returns debt to its long run value. But under fiscal dominance tax rates
cannot fall to pass on the beneficial tax revenue effects of higher productivity. If there is
an unexpected increase in productivity, debt must therefore increase immediately through a
surprise decrease in the rate of inflation that is about five times larger than under a Ricardian
policy. The reason is that lower inflation leads to an increase in the real interest rate that
further reduces demand and therefore marginal cost. The higher real interest rate causes debt
to rise for two interrelated reasons. First, it directly increases the real cost of servicing the
debt. Second, it reduces demand for output and thus for labor, which reduces tax revenue
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and leads to a primary deficit. But the real interest rate drop is quickly reversed while higher
productivity continues for some time, thereby turning the primary deficit into a primary
surplus. At that point government debt starts to approach its long run level from above.
Figure 5b shows that an increase in government spending leads to a fall in the public
debt, rather than an increase as in Figure 2b. Under a Ricardian policy higher government
spending is translated, without any increase in inflation, into higher debt that is subsequently
repaid very gradually through higher taxes. But under fiscal dominance tax rates cannot rise
to deal with a higher debt level. If there is an unexpected increase in spending, debt must
therefore be eroded immediately with surprise and very sizeable inflation that is allowed to
reduce the real interest rate, thereby lowering the real cost of servicing the debt. In addition,
the combination of higher government spending and a lower real interest rate boosts demand
for output and thus for labor, which in turn increases tax revenue and leads to a primary
surplus. But because the real interest rate drop is quickly reversed while elevated government
spending continues for some time, this almost immediately turns into a primary deficit. At
that point government debt starts to approach its long run level from below.
The impulse responses for a government spending shock in Figure 5b look qualitatively
similar to those reported in Benigno and Woodford (2006) in their discussion of the
exogenous taxation case. Our policy rule (20) may therefore be one simple way to implement
the target criterion they have in mind. It implements their prescription that inflation
expectations must be firmly anchored, in the sense that while inflation is much more volatile
than in the Ricardian case, it also quickly returns to its long run value. The importance of
this prescription stems from the fact that it requires less inflation to maintain intertemporal
solvency, because with rapid but anchored movements in inflation the endogenous response
of output and therefore of tax revenue is stronger and moves debt in the same direction as
inflation.
But in practice, as shown in a large empirical literature covering many different countries,
a firm anchoring of inflation expectations has only been successfully implemented in cases
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where monetary policy responds aggressively to inflation. Yet as we have seen, this is neither
a feasible nor a desirable alternative in a world of fiscal dominance. This poses a severe
problem for policymakers, because it seems very doubtful that the public would interpret
a monetary rule with a very negative inflation coefficient as providing a firm anchor for
inflation. The inclusion of fiscal variables in the monetary rule makes very little difference
to these results, either in terms of the optimal inflation coefficient or in terms of welfare
outcomes. The welfare gains from removing fiscal dominance altogether are an order of
magnitude greater than the gains from targeting fiscal variables through nominal interest
rates.
5 Conclusions
This paper has considered optimal monetary policy when the fiscal authority is unable,
or unwilling, to control tax revenues and spending. Weak taxation systems, tax evasion,
banking crises or overspending are some of the factors that can undermine the control of
fiscal deficits in developing economies. The paper shows that under such circumstances the
usual prescription of the inflation targeting literature, a more than proportional interest rate
response to inflation innovations known as the Taylor principle, becomes impractical and
undesirable. The optimal coefficient on inflation is invariably highly negative.
It has not been clear from the literature whether this situation can be rescued by a central
bank that adapts itself to fiscal dominance by conditioning its actions on fiscal variables such
as government spending or government debt. This paper directly addresses that question.
It finds that responding to government spending does not even expand the set of inflation
coefficients that give rise to unique equilibria. Responding to debt is more promising because
the set of unique equilibria is expanded and allows for an aggressive response to inflation.
However, an interest rate rule that tackles fiscal dominance by responding to debt and that
simultaneously satisfies the Taylor principle is not a robust solution. First, volatility of all
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variables is extremely high when an aggressive response to inflation is attempted. Second,
and as a direct consequence, policies that follow the Taylor principle always violate the zero
lower bound on nominal interest rates. Third, and also as a direct consequence of volatility,
welfare considerations call for a highly negative coefficient on inflation.
There is one positive result, which is that under fiscal dominance it does make sense for
the central bank to include fiscal variables in its policy rule, because doing so improves
welfare. But that improvement is trivial compared to what could be accomplished by
removing fiscal dominance altogether. Only solid fiscal fundamentals allow for both a benign
outcome in terms of welfare and for the ability to fight inflation aggressively. Fiscal reform
in developing countries is therefore an indispensable step before implementing inflation
targeting regimes.
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Appendix A. First Order Conditions
Let the multiplier of the budget constraint (11) be given by Λt, and let λt = ΛtPt.
Denote real money balances by mt = Mt/Pt. Finally, use the fact that the equilibrium
is symmetric, with Pt(i) = Pt ∀i. Then we have the following conditions for government
debt, consumption, labor supply, money demand, and price setting:
λt = βEt
µ
λt+1
Rt
πt+1
¶
, (A.1)
1
ct
= λt
µ
1 +
2Act
mt
− 2
√
AB
¶
, (A.2)
δ
1− ht
= λtwt(1− τ t) , (A.3)
mt =
Ã
Ac2t
B + 1− 1Rt
! 1
2
, (A.4)
yt
µ
1− η
1 + η
wt
zt
¶
=
θ
1 + η
πt (πt − 1)−
βθ
1 + η
Et
µ
λt+1
λt
πt+1 (πt+1 − 1)
¶
. (A.5)
Appendix B. Determinacy and Zero Lower Bound Computations
The pictures in Figures 1, 3 and 4 are computed using 101 points both for the coefficients
on the horizontal and on the vertical axis. The coefficient φRy is assumed to belong to the
set {−0.5, 0, 0.5}. Hence, for each rule we consider a grid of 30603 points. The welfare
evaluations may be inaccurate for points near the indeterminacy regions. To overcome this
problem we only compute welfare for points lying in the interior of the unique equilibrium
area. The statistics referred to in the paper were computed through 500 simulations of 100
periods. All computations have been done with the DYNARE toolkit.
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Appendix C. Welfare Computations
Following the Bellman equation one can define:
V Ft = Ut + βEtV Ft+1 , (21)
where Ut is period utility and V Ft is life-time utility. Conditional welfare is the value of life-
time utility taking into account that the initial starting point is a predetermined level. This
value can be obtained from the a second order approximation to the policy function of V Ft.
With the policy function at hand, conditional welfare can be obtained by plugging the initial
steady state into the policy function of V Ft. It is common to consider the initial steady state
to be the non-stochastic steady state.
We conduct welfare comparisons of different rules. Consider the reference policy,
denoted by r, and an alternative policy denoted by a. We have taken the reference policy
to be the Ramsey policy. The conditional welfare of the reference regime is
V F r0 = E0
∞X
t=0
βtU(crt , h
r
t ) , (22)
where crt and hrt denote consumption and hours of work in the reference regime. Similarly,
conditional welfare in the alternative regime is
V F a0 = E0
∞X
t=0
βtU(cat , h
a
t ) . (23)
We denote by λ the welfare cost of following the alternative regime. It is defined as the
fraction of regime r’s consumption that the household would be willing to lose to be as well
off under regime a as regime r:
V F a0 = E0
∞X
t=0
βtU((1 + λ)crt , h
r
t ) . (24)
For the specific utility function considered, the expression can be rearranged as
V F a0 = V F
r
0 +
1
1− β ln(1 + λ) , (25)
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where λ is defined as an implicit function, which we will approximate up to second order.
Following Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004b), we introduce a parameter σ that scales the
variance of the exogenous stochastic processes gt and zt. Totally differentiating equation
(25) twice with respect to σ we can obtain λσσ, which is the only term different from zero
in the second order approximation around the non-stochastic steady state. It easily follows
that
λ = (1− β)(V F aσσ − V F rσσ)
σ2
2
, (26)
or equivalently
λ = (1− β)(V F a0 − V F r0 )
σ2
2
. (27)
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Figure 1: Ricardian Fiscal Policy and the Taylor Rule
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Figure 2a: Productivity Shock under Ricardian Fiscal Policy
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Figure 5a: Productivity Shock under Fiscal Dominance
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